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Abstract
We investigate an election model with costly accuracy improvement by allowing
heterogeneity in the cost functions. We find that the aggregate accuracy in large elections is
characterized by the average value of the inverse of the second derivative at zero information.
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Consider the following situation. A large society is using majority rule to try to choose the
“correct” alternative of two choices. However, each member of the society, say i, must invest
the costs of Ci(qi) so that he or she can vote for the correct alternative with probability qi.
The members’ utility from the correct choice by society is normalized to 1, and the incorrect
one to 0.
There are two opposite eﬀects of the size of the society on the accuracy of society’s choice.
On the one hand, society can utilize the law of large numbers.1 On the other hand, large
size gives each member only a negligible incentive to improve his or her accuracy.2 If so, how
does the aggregate accuracy, namely the probability that the majority of members vote for
the correct alternative, depend on the parameters of the cost functions?
In his pioneering work, Martinelli (2004) considered cases with homogeneous cost func-
tions (i.e., Ci = C for all i), and found that, if C0(1=2) = 0, then the probability depends
only on C00(1=2). We allow heterogeneity here, and ﬁnd that the generalized key parameter
is not the average of C00




For n 2 N, the following normal form game is considered. There are 2n + 1 players, i.e.,
“voters”. The strategy of each voter i = 1;:::;2n + 1 is the accuracy of his or her vote,





xj(qj;n) ¸ n + 1
!
¡ Ci(qi;n); (1)
where each xj(qj;n) is independently drawn from its corresponding distribution as
xj(qj;n) =
½
1 with probability qj;n
0 with probability 1 ¡ qj;n
:
1At the extreme, this eﬀect makes the accuracy converge to 1. This line dates back to Condorcet (1785).
For general results with exogenous accuracies in this line, see, e.g., Berend and Paroush (1998).
2At the extreme, this eﬀect makes all members give up any investment (i.e., qi = 1=2 for all i), even with
a ﬁnite size of their society, which results in its choice being as if it were decided by a toss of a fair coin (i.e.,
being correct only with probability 1/2). This line dates back to Downs (1957). For models with a binary
choice of accuracies in this line, see, e.g., Mukhopadhaya (2003).
1The ﬁrst term in (1) represents the expected utility from the chosen alternative, which, by
normalization, is equal to the probability that the correct alternative is chosen.3 The second
term represents the costs that yield the accuracy.
For simplicity, we focus on cases with a ﬁnite number of cost functions, fCkgk=1;:::;K; for
all k, mk;n voters have Ck, and
P
k mk;n = 2n + 1. We assume that, for all k, mk;n=(2n +
1) ! ®¤
k > 0 as n ! 1. For all k, Ck(q) is strictly increasing, strictly convex, and twice
diﬀerentiable in q. We also have Ck(1=2) = 0, Ck(1) > 1, and C0
k(1=2) = 0.
2.2 Equilibrium and Aggregate Accuracy









i(qi;n) for i = 1;:::;2n + 1: (2)
By the assumptions about cost functions (e.g., Ck(1) > 1 and C0
k(1=2) = 0 for all k assure
the interiority), (a) (2) is the suﬃcient and necessary condition for fqi;ngi to constitute
an equilibrium, and (b) there exists at least one strategy proﬁle fqi;ngi satisfying (2) by
Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem.5
The aggregate accuracy, namely the probability that the correct alternative is chosen in









We yield the following asymptotic property.





xi(qi;n) ¸ n + 1
!
! Φ(c
¤) as n ! 1; (3)
3Strategic voting is not explicitly considered here. For the importance of distinguishing between strategic
and sincere voting, see the seminal work of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996).
4Note that voters i can aﬀect the “outcome” only when their vote is pivotal, i.e.,
P
j6=i xj(qj) = n.
5There may be multiple equilibria.












where Φ is the standard normal distribution function and Á the corresponding probability
density function.6
Thus, in a large society (i.e., asymptotically), the aggregate accuracy depends only on
the inverse of the average of 1=C00
i (1=2).
Proof: For simplicity, denote Sn ´
P2n+1
i=1 xi(qi;n) and Si
n ´
P










where En ´ E[Sn] =
P
i qi;n and Vn ´ var(Sn) =
P




















h6=i;j xh(qh;n). Then, Pr(Si;j
n = n¡1) · Pr(Si;j
n = n), since qh;n ¸ 1=2 for
all h 6= i;j. Thus,
Pr(S
i
n = n) = qj;n Pr(S
i;j
n = n ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ qj;n)Pr(S
i;j
n = n) (6)
is nonincreasing in qj;n. Therefore,
Pr(S
i


















jqi;n ¡ 1=2j = 0: (8)

































































¯ ! 0 as n ! 1:
6We use conventions as 1=1 = 0 and 1=0 = 1.



















































as n ! 1:



































as n ! 1;
where the ﬁrst term converges to
p
1=4 as we will see in (ii) below, and the third term
converges to 1 by Stirling’s formula.7 Thus, along such subsequences, the LHS of (5) converges
to 0, which equals 4Á(1)=1.




























where (ii) and (iii) follow from (8), the premises (I), (II), and (III’) of Theorem 1 in McDonald
(1979) are satisﬁed. Note that j(n ¡ 1) ¡ Enj ¸ (2n + 1)(1=2) ¡ (n ¡ 1) = 3=2 > 1, and
lim
n!1
































Vn Pr(Sn = n + 1)
Á(cn)
= 1: (10)
As we will brieﬂy see in the ﬁnal paragraph,
Pr(S
i
n = n) ¸ Pr(Sn = n ¡ 1), and (11)
jPr(S
i
n = n) ¡ Pr(Sn = n + 1)j · jPr(Sn = n + 1) ¡ Pr(Sn = n ¡ 1)j: (12)
Thus, by (9) and (11), if c¤ = 0, then, along such subsequences the LHS of (5) diverges to


















Therefore, since limn!1 Vn=(2n + 1) = 1=4, as seen in (ii) above, along such subsequences
the LHS of (5) converges to 4Á(c¤)=c¤.
These imply that cn ! c¤ solving (4) as n grows. (3) is then a simple consequence of the
central limit theorem.8
Now, we brieﬂy see (11) and (12). Since qi;n ¸ 1=2 for all i,
Pr(S
i
n = n ¡ 2) · Pr(S
i
n = n ¡ 1) · Pr(S
i
n = n), and (13)
Pr(S
i
n = n ¡ 1) · Pr(S
i
n = n + 1): (14)
Note that for any m,
Pr(Sn = m) = qi;n Pr(S
i
n = m ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ qi;n)Pr(S
i
n = m): (15)
(13) and (15) imply (11). If Pr(Si
n = n + 1) ¸ Pr(Si
n = n), then,





n = n ¡ 2) + (1 ¡ qi;n)Pr(S
i
n = n ¡ 1) = Pr(Sn = n ¡ 1);
which implies (12). If Pr(Si
n = n + 1) < Pr(Si
n = n), then, by (13), (14), and (15),
0 < Pr(S
i
n = n) ¡ Pr(Sn = n + 1)
· Pr(Sn = n + 1) ¡ Pr(S
i
n = n + 1)
· Pr(Sn = n + 1) ¡ (qi;n Pr(S
i
n = n ¡ 2) + (1 ¡ qi;n)Pr(S
i
n = n ¡ 1))
= Pr(Sn = n + 1) ¡ Pr(Sn = n ¡ 1);
8See, e.g., Feller (1971).
5where the second inequality follows from qi;n ¸ 1=2. Thus, (12) holds. 2
Our theorem can derive the corresponding result of Martinelli (2004).
Corollary (Martinelli (2004)). Suppose that all voters have an identical cost function, C.





To be precise, only symmetric equilibria (i.e., qi;n = qn for all i) are considered in Martinelli
(2004). Note that qi;n 6= qj;n with Ci = Cj can occur under our equilibrium concept. Thus,
in allowing the possibility of asymmetric equilibria, we generalize his result even within cases
with homogeneous cost functions.
4. Discussions
Our result provides some answers to the topics below. Note that one could not ﬁnd them if
one misinterpreted the result of (16) in the homogeneous cost cases and used the average of
C00
i (1=2) as the proxy.
4.1 Severity of Convergence to 100% Accuracy
Martinelli’s (2004) result of (16) implies that, if cost functions are homogeneous, then the
aggregate accuracy cannot converge to 1 unless C00
i (1=2) = 0 for all voters.9 One may
conclude, based on this, that the convergence to 100% accuracy is implausible. However, our
result suggests that such a conclusion is too premature. Observe that, if C00
k(1=2) = 0 for
some k, then, however small ®¤










which implies Φ(c¤) = 1. Thus, to attain convergence to 100% accuracy, extreme cost
functions satisfying C00
i (1=2) = 0 are required only for an arbitrarily small fraction of voters.
4.2 Heterogeneous Utilities and the Eﬀect of Pie Allocation
9Note that Φ(c¤) = 1 corresponds to the RHS being 0.
6Consider that all the members have an identical cost function, C(¢), but may diﬀer in their





xj(qj;n) ¸ n + 1
!
¡ C(qi;n):
We can deal with this situation within our framework by letting cost functions as Ck = C=rk.
Then, how does the change in the distribution of the utilities, frkgk=1;:::;K, aﬀect the















Thus, the aggregate accuracy depends only on
P
k ®¤
krk, the average utility among the mem-
bers.
Note that, if the average is unchanged, then the sum is also unchanged. Thus, we can
interpret changing the distribution of the utilities, but retaining its average, as changing the
way of allocating the pie resulting from the society’s choice. Then, the above result means
that, unless we assume a diﬀerence in voting abilities (represented by cost functions) among
members, at least asymptotically, the aggregate accuracy is not aﬀected by the manner of
allocating the pie; for example, we can allocate more to vulnerable people in the society
without causing any deterioration of the aggregate accuracy.
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